Yes, and the Royal Governor of Virginia, 4th Earl of Dunsmore, was the first in the Colonies to offer freedom to slaves that would rally to the King’s flag, effective 7 November 1775. As one might expect, this caused some consternation on the part of slave owners, no matter their allegiance. Although several hundred people would take the Earl up on his offer, there weren’t any large-scale defections.

“They did not know the colonists as well as they should have.”

True, and can probably be blamed in equal measures on complacency, and the communications tech of the day.

Many in India shamed the Brits into capitulation.
But if you lay that same head down on a train track where a Muslim is involved…he won’t hesitate to run right over a Hindu ascetic where a Brit wouldn’t.

That explains how India went from Gandhi to The Bomb.

Attitudes, cultures are all-important.

“Whether because British strategy revolved around isolating New England, or because the relatively low population density in the South made it seem a ‘softer’ target, I cannot say.”

A lot of things were going on there, but I think one of them was that too many in Westminster counted too much on the Cavalier roots of the southern colonies as a predictor of loyalty.

The large slave populations were also seen as a promising element, not present in New England or the mid-Atlantic colonies.

These were not idiotic impulses! But clearly the British leadership overestimated them. They did not know the colonists as well as they should have.

Now, however, they’re about to lose their own ‘sceptered isle of Albion thru suicide via tolerance.

This is the kind of detail I like to see:

“1776 was a leap year, giving February 29 days.”

https://bkivey.wordpress.com/the-american-war-for-independence/

Blair Ivey: You need to include the link IN your comment. Readers might not realize they can get to these essays by clicking on your name.

Let me help: You can find Blair’s War for Independence posts here.

Richard M observed: “Cornwallis’s southern campaign still looks like a resounding strategic failure, just not as catastrophic.”

The British continually, and greatly, overestimated Loyalist support in the Southern Colonies. Attempts to raise men fell well short of requirements, and those that did show up, would desert when stuff got real. In contrast to actions earlier in the War, the Rebels would stay and fight, and were learning how to do so effectively. It was evident as early as the winter of ’75 – ’76 that support for the Crown was not widespread in the South, but this was ignored. Whether because British strategy revolved around isolating New England, or because the relatively low population density in the South made it seem a ‘softer’ target, I cannot say.

It certainly *mattered*. One of those “Cleopatra’s Nose” moments in history, you might think….

Tuchman *might* oversell it slightly. The overall logistics and domestic politics of the British strategic position were still ominous, even if they had been somehow able to extract or reinforce Cornwallis in the Virginia Peninsula; Cornwallis’s southern campaign still looks like a resounding strategic failure, just not as catastrophic. The probability still points to American independence at that point, but scenarios building on a healthy and vigorous Rodney more likely just result in a less good deal for that independence in the final settlement. But even that would have big historical knock-on effects: an American Republic which ends up smaller, weaker, and much less consequential on the world stage.

While you’re at it, her book about the generation leading up to World War One, The Proud Tower, is even more ripped from the headlines.

This point could be underlined, I suppose, by observing that what was really being represented by these men/families holding these Rotten Burrough seats was the pecuniary interests of *these families*, rather than the islands or the populations thereof (free or slave). These things were not the same!

This was much the same rebuttal offered by aggrieved colonists in the 13 Colonies when in the lead up to war, parliamentary leadership tried to argue that the Colonies were effectively represented by certain MPs who happened to have financial or land interests in the Colonies. “They are not representing *us*, they are representing their pocketbooks.”

One of my takeaways from “The First Salute” is that Rodney’s prostate problem may have won the Revolution for the colonies.

cjaz99: This was was stated unequivocally in the book, and it surprised me when I read it. From page 134:

The West Indies, with their valuable produce, made a centerpiece of commerce directly re-represented by a number of West Indian planters who held twelve to fifteen seats in Parliament and exerted their influence through their wealth and connections rather than through numbers.

Maybe I misunderstood this sentence. These planters got elected to Parliament based on their Great Britain status representing districts in Great Britain, but since they owned large plantations in the West Indies they used that status to represent the islands.

https://bkivey.wordpress.com/

May I ask whether you were oversimplifying or whether this is actually stated in the book?

It appears this was not a new attitude, nor just by the British. Many remember today that the Dutch founded New York city and state—as “New Amsterdam”—during the early 1600’s, then decades later (a century before the Revolution) it was seized from them by the English, renaming both to New York. But few remember now that the Dutch came back later in that war and reconquered the colony. However, during the subsequent peace conference, the Dutch gave up New York in lieu of… Surinam (Dutch Guiana). The latter was regarded as being much more valuable to them—and the rest is history.

D Schrader: Typo fixed. Thank you!

Blair Ivey: Please post the link or url to your site so people can read what you’ve been doing.

As Robert notes, the British did not display much sense of urgency at this time, and despite major losses at Breed’s (Bunker) Hill, and a disastrous Southern campaign, they did indeed fail to grasp the level of organization of the Patriots. Rather than move troops to the Carolinas to support efforts in late 1775, LTG William Howe elected to overwinter in Boston, while MG John Burgoyne went back to England for the season. While it was common at the time for militaries to suspend operations in Winter, it wasn’t common for high-level officers to leave the scene for months at a time.

Parliament was planning on a limited response in 1776, believing that isolating New England would end the rebellion. The Loyal Opposition pooh-poohed the idea, arguing that the situation was too far gone for half-measures.

One thing I thought it really brought home was just how *good* George Washington was as a leader and strategist — to the point where you really come away appreciating that he was, more than any other Founding Father, the *necessary* man that brought America into existence: a Tier 1 case for the Great Man theory of history. If someone like Gates or Lee had been put in charge of the Continental Army instead, history would look very, very different.