I thought I was clear. Without understanding the performance of the heat shield, no one knows whether the performance seen — the failure of chunks of heat shield coming off during reentry — was worst case, best case, or in-between.

If it is worst case, then the shield is safe enough for use, as it will never get worse than that. If it is best case or in-between, then we really don’t know how safe it is for use. Using it in a different way, as they intend to do, does not reassure us that it is safe, even if the first reentry was worst case, because changing the usage likely changes the performance. If they don’t understand the performance, then they don’e know what the new performance will be.

We didn’t even let Apollo be that unsafe, and that was when NASA was fighting a proxy battle in the Cold War. At that time, it was acceptable to take greater risks, but these days it is not. We already know how to be safer in space travel than we were during Apollo, but this is violating safety in ways that, after Challenger and Columbia, were promised would not be done. At least with those two disasters, engineers had made assertions that the problems were reasonably understood — although ultimately they were proved incorrect in their analyses.

With Orion, we really don’t know whether the problem is well understood. They tell us that there was vaporization deep within the material, the resulting pressure breaking off those chunks, but they have not assured us that the material was tested for the new profile, that the conditions that cause the vaporization do not also occur under the temperatures and durations of the new profile.

That is why I would not risk my life or anyone else’s life (well, maybe Putin and a couple of others) on the planned Artemis II mission’s reentry phase.

The life support is another topic, because there have been new life support systems that were not adequate to keep the crew warm. Other life support problems could arise, and they, too, have not been tested in the relative safety of low Earth orbit, where reentry can be up to hours away, rather than days.

Using light alone, CO2 can be broken down:
https://phys.org/news/2025-12-high-energy-photons-conversion-greenhouse.html

A 28 Watt UV light of 185 nm will do the trick

Though this was intended for environmental remediation, knowing something can end the death grip carbon has on oxygen makes me wonder what else may come from any nuclear lightbulb tech. Americium doesn’t require much for criticality.

I have also read that light, not heat, causes water to evaporate… ironically around the gree wavelength where water and light were thought to interact the least.

Now we have transparent ceramics
https://techxplore.com/news/2025-12-transparent-ceramic-boost-internet-energy.html

On detecting AI images
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/ukrainian-ballistic-missile-development-and-deployment.39849/page-3#post-860249

“Richard M: You might be assuming those engineers have the courage to do such a thing. Based on history within NASA and the big space companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, they don’t. They will fold their hands, shrug, and say, “We’re just doing as we’re told.””

I believe Charlie Camarda has communicated his concerns to Isaacman, but a) I have no idea whether Isaacman read or responded to them, and b) Charlie Camarda is retired from NASA and has nothing to lose, career wise, by speaking out.

(I do not know if Camarda’s concerns are justified, since NASA is operating with extremely low transparency on this issue. But I find him a credible figure, and I think he ought to be part of any review process.)

We know NASA is supposed to have whistleblower protections for its own peeps and those at its contractors, but we also know that those protections don’t function as vigorously as they are supposed to. I am hoping that others will speak out anyway.

But I agree, in the end, Jared needs to have access to the information, and he needs to have the moxie to act on it if and when he does get it.

Let us not mischaracterize what Rand is arguing: that is, be willing to accept greater risk in human spaceflight; but be sure you are being fully honest with yourself, and transparent with everyone else involved, about what those risks are. The concern with NASA is that this honesty and transparency about the risks of the Artemis II mission is lacking.

NASA’s Apollo management was generally pretty good at this, to the extent they could quantify it. The Shuttle management, not so much. Artemis so far looks closer to the Shuttle than Apollo in this regard, but it is hard to be conclusive when they black out 95% of the study report.

Yes, kudos to Keith Cowing then. The blind squirrel finds a nut.

The new profile is intended to reduce the highest temperature that the heat shield reaches, but that also means that it takes longer to slow down, keeping the heat shield at a fairly high temperature for a longer amount of time. Reduced thermal stress sounds like it should reduce or eliminate the problem.

Because NASA does not seem to yet understand the performance of the heat shield, I don’t think that they can be sure that the lower temperature is low enough to avoid the problem of chunks coming off the heat shield. If the temperature is not low enough, then all they have done is to give the problem even more time to develop and for even more chunks to depart the spacecraft and perhaps for a second layer of chunks to depart the spacecraft, possibly leaving too little material remaining, in spots, to prevent excessive heating within the capsule or burn through.

It is why engineers want to fully understand a problem before determining a solution. If we don’t understand what is happening, then how can we be sure that we solved it safely and successfully?

Making the internal report & results public, as Isaacman seems to suggest, could reduce our concerns about a lack of understanding of the problem, or it could increase our concern if we are not assured. Asking Berger or Dodd to explain it all to us would also be a good idea. Dodd is very good at diving into a subject, understanding it, and then explaining it in layman’s terms (he is not an engineer, so he is good at avoiding engineering jargons or explaining them).

Sounds way too much like “We were just following orders”

Yikes!!

Richard M: You might be assuming those engineers have the courage to do such a thing. Based on history within NASA and the big space companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, they don’t. They will fold their hands, shrug, and say, “We’re just doing as we’re told.”

This is going to take aggressive action on Isaacman’s part. Nothing will change without his strong leadership demanding blunt answers.

I don’t know if this has happened already, but if I were Charlie Camarda or any other NASA (or Lockheed) engineer that has any concerns about Orion’s heat shield, I sure would hope that they make the effort to reach out to Isaacman directly, now. It couldn’t hurt to try. Time’s running out. And they may give a push right when it’s needed.

P.S. I give my hat tip for the document link to Keith Cowing, by the way. Credit where credit is due!

Ditto the kudos on your spelunking find. It’s going to take awhile to get through all of that, but the few pages I read starting on pg. 46 certainly make me feel a lot better about Artemis 2.

Richard M: Thank you for finding this document. Most interesting. Overall it tells us that Isaacman’s focus is in the right place, not just on Orion but on reshaping NASA entirely. He might have said at the hearing that he isn’t targeting any center or department for elimination, but his plans certainly do include that possibility. He intends to review every center to see if they are producing, and if they are not, heads will roll.

Whether however he will have the courage to rethink the Artemis-2 mission as manned remains unknown. I would love to be one of those “outside reporters” giving input, but I doubt he is even aware I exist.

The whole ATHENA draft, at least as it existed at the time of the leak, was published on a Google Drive file a few days ago, and until now, I had not had a chance to read any of it. But it sounds like he *is* concerned about the problem, and throws out possibilities for how to explore it once he is in office.

Anyway, if Jared is still thinking along these lines, Eric Berger and Charlie Camarda have to be licking their chops.

* Artemis II, then Ill
– Catch up on architecture and safety concerns (heatshield. engines. etc.)
and make sure nothing looks totally broken
– Reconcile heatshield – review internal audit and work done to date.
• Consider: Should we host dissenting opinions (i.e. Charlie C),
should we make the internal report & results public?
• Bring in outside reporter (i.e. Berger, Dodd) to tell the ‘final story’ on
the Artemis II heatshield

Link to document here, for those who haven’t dug it up yet: https://drive.google.com/file/d/16j95BNM4wDRD2bcHFhYJ7m-L3pAThuUf/view

The Briz-M has failed on ascent a number of times, but these sorts of failures don’t result in orbital debris as the vehicles never make orbit. There have been at least two on-orbit Briz-M explosions, though, and both were pretty messy. But there have been even more explosions of Delta II upper stages of the kinds in use prior to 1981, though I can’t find an exact number. I mention this because I thought you might be appreciative of another reason to retroactively hate the Delta II as that seems to be one of your most durable hobbyhorses.

In terms of sheer presence, the 20 “most-concerning” derelict upper stages still on-orbit are all from Zenit-2s. Many of the next 30 on the “50 most-concerning” list are also from Zenit-2s. The PRC has long been making a manful effort to eclipse the Soviets/Russians in the sheer volume and “concernedness” of orbital gubbage, but they’ve apparently got a ways to go yet to accomplish that. Still, they’ve definitely got the superior momentum these days.

It’s going to be nice when both nations are gone and we won’t be facing any backchat when we sweep the skies of their entire space histories.

The best part about Falcon (to me) isn’t re-use–all rocket first stages go in the drink eventually–but how the upper stage disposes of itself in a controlled manner.

In some respects, the Briz-M is the worst offender when it comes to space debris.

Upper stages can be a pain–it is why side payload mount/parallel staging concepts have an advantage in terms of all engines near pad level…out in the open.

On another PRC-related topic, that Qingzhou cargo thingy bears a fair resemblance to Vast’s Haven-1 space station.

Nah, just dreaming. Use zip-ties and attach them to the Chinese station. That’ll show ’em.

Two ideas, both involving space tugs.

1) attach and deorbit.

2) attach and move them to fly/orbit in formation near the Chicoms space station. Call the mission Return To Sender