Starliner docked to ISS in 2024.

NASA today released its final investigation report on the causes behind the Starliner thruster issues during that capsule’s only manned mission in ISS, issues that almost prevented the spacecraft from docking successfully and could have left it manned and out-of-control while still in orbit.

You can read the report here [pdf]. NASA administrator Jared Isaacman made it clear in his own statement that the Starliner incident was far more serious than originally let on.

“To undertake missions that change the world, we must be transparent about both our successes and our shortcomings. We have to own our mistakes and ensure they never happen again. Beyond technical issues, it is clear that NASA permitted overarching programmatic objectives of having two providers capable of transporting astronauts to-and-from orbit, influence engineering and operational decisions, especially during and immediately after the mission. We are correcting those mistakes. Today, we are formally declaring a Type A mishap and ensuring leadership accountability so situations like this never reoccur. We look forward to working with Boeing as both organizations implement corrective actions and return Starliner to flight only when ready.”

A Type A mishap is one in which a spacecraft could become entirely uncontrollable, leading to its loss and the death of all on board. Though Starliner was NOT lost, for a short while as it hung close to ISS that result was definitely possible. Its thrusters were not working. It couldn’t maneuver to dock, nor could it maneuver to do a proper and safe de-orbit. Fortunately, engineers were able to figure out a way to get the thursters operational again so a docking could occur, but until then, it was certainly a Type A situation.

The report outlines in great detail the background behind Starliner’s thruster issues, the management confusion between NASA and Boeing, and the overall confused management at Boeing itself, including its generally lax testing standards.

The report’s recommends that NASA impose greater control over future commercial contracts, noting that under the capitalism model that NASA has been following:

NASA’s hands-off approach during contract initialization resulted in insufficient systems knowledge and available data to the government for accepting a development vehicle as a service.

NASA’s adoption of a commercial services procurement strategy through the CCP prioritized provider-led development and minimized traditional NASA insight and oversight. This contributed to the creation of the previous intermediate causes and organizational factors that produced insufficient data for NASA to fully understand system qualification of the Starliner spacecraft. This approach led to gaps in end-to-end verification, validation, and interface management, ultimately contributing to crew and mission risk. In accordance with the SAA and guiding documentation, NASA teams were prohibited from providing feedback during key design phases or requiring closure on feedback submitted.

One meatball to rule them all!

The solution: Establish a whole range of new management processes to closely supervise the development of any new spacecraft.

In other words, go back to the old system where NASA controlled all and micro-managed everything. This is a failed idea, something that NASA has tried time after time with little success. It punishes everyone, without punishing the bad apples. And if implemented could end up destroying entirely the present renaissance in space.

Ironically, the report’s recommendations completely miss the fundamentals revealed within the report itself.

What the report makes clear is that Boeing is not a company NASA can strongly rely on. It failed to fix these problems in a timely manner, before the launch. It made numerous bad engineering decisions during construction. And once launched it took a generally bad approach to dealing with the problems, as they happened.

In the capitalism model, NASA must let private enterprise do the work. It is NASA’s job to buy the best products, from companies it can rely on utterly. The last thing NASA should be doing is micro-managing what those companies do.

Let freedom rule!

The solution is for NASA to stop buying products from the bad apples. Isaacman says in his statement that he “looks forward to working with Boeing” in the future. Bah. While for now it might make sense to fly Starliner on an unmanned cargo mission to ISS to once again test its systems, it should be very clear that using it for future manned missions is a very very low priority. The company has not built a good product worth buying.

If Isaacman and NASA had any faith in freedom and capitalism, both would instantly see the entire Starliner incident as an example of “Let the buyer beware.” We thought Boeing was a better company than it was. We won’t make that mistake again. Let’s find other American companies we can buy better products from!

That’s what freedom and competition is all about. The good rise to the top. The bad fall to the wayside. But you must try them all for awhile to distinguish them from each other. This report — and what it tells us about Boeing and Starliner itself — is part of that process. Competition and freedom will give NASA many alternatives, good and bad. As it learns the difference it should simply buy products from those who do good work.

Sadly, it is very unclear from this report’s conclusions whether this is the lesson NASA and Isaacman are taking from the Boeing-Starliner debacle. Instead, it looks once again like Isaacman wants to return to the old days where NASA ran everything, and private enterprise was squelched under a government space program run from DC with little freedom or innovation.

If so, NASA’s future in space will be dim indeed. The better companies, such as SpaceX, will want to work less and less with the agency, leaving it stuck with the weak sisters like Boeing.